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NOTES
BLANKET POLICIES FOR STRIP SEARCHING
PRETRIAL DETAINEES:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ARGUMENT FOR
REASONABLENESS
Daphne Ha*
In 2010, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits
joined the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in upholding the
constitutionality of blanket strip search policies in correctional institutions.
As a result, more government officials across the country can strip search
arrestees and pretrial detainees as a matter of routine procedure without
any reasonable suspicion that the detainees have contraband. These
detainees include individuals without criminal histories who are arrested
for traffic or other minor offenses, and who have done nothing to suggest
that they are attempting to smuggle contraband into correctional facilities.
This Note recognizes that an objective legal analysis can be informed by
relevant social science findings and relies on an interdisciplinary approach
in analyzing the constitutionality of strip search policies. Research has
consistently found that strip searches are invasive, humiliating, and
traumatizing even when conducted professionally and according to
protocol. At worst, strip search policies allow corrections officers to abuse
their power and systematically perpetrate sexual violence toward detainees.
Ultimately, this Note argues that blanket strip search policies are
unconstitutional and that courts must only uphold strip searches when there
is an individualized, reasonable suspicion that a detainee is concealing
contraband.
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INTRODUCTION
The San Francisco Sheriff’s Department implemented a policy that
required visual strip searches of all arrestees brought into its six county

2011]

STRIP SEARCHING PRETRIAL DETAINEES

2723

jails. 1 As a result, sheriffs strip searched numerous individuals including
Mary Bull, who was arrested during a political protest.2 Jailors forcibly
removed her clothing, left her naked in a cell for eleven hours, and
subjected her to two body cavity searches.3 They released her after another
twelve hours without any charges. 4 Similarly, Leigh Fleming, arrested for
disturbing the peace, underwent a body cavity search and was left naked for
five hours. 5 She was never charged with a crime. 6 Charli Johnson, a third
victim, was arrested after driving with a suspended license. 7 Male officers
forcibly strip searched her in a hallway and left her naked for twelve hours.8
Like Bull and Fleming, Johnson was released the next day without any
charges. 9
On February 9, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held in Bull v. City and County of San Francisco10 that the policy of the San
Francisco Sheriff’s Department did not violate these individuals’ Fourth
Amendment rights. 11 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit overruled its own
case law, 12 joining a circuit split created in 2008 by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Powell v. Barrett. 13 Even more
recently, on September 21, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit agreed that correctional facilities’ policies of strip searching all
arrestees were reasonable. 14 Together, these cases suggest a general trend
of interpreting the Fourth Amendment to allow “[s]uspicionless, routine,
mandatory strip search policies.” 15 The relevance of such a trend cannot be

1. Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 989 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010).
11. See id. at 966.
12. See, e.g., Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 615 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that jailors
violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by strip searching her after she was
arrested for a minor offense and there was no reasonable suspicion that she had contraband
or a communicable disease), overruled by Bull, 595 F.3d 964; infra notes 273–74.
13. 541 F.3d 1298, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (recognizing that other circuit
courts have required reasonable suspicion in justifying strip searches, but declining to do so).
In Powell, the Eleventh Circuit also overruled one of its prior cases. Id. at 1307; see Wilson
v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1341 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a blanket policy requiring strip
searches of all arrestees admitted to the county jail was unconstitutional), overruled by
Powell, 541 F.3d 1298; see also Bull, 595 F.3d at 980–81 (agreeing with the Eleventh
Circuit’s reasoning that strip search policies do not violate the rights of arrestees who are
mixed with the general jail population); infra Part II.B.1.
14. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 308 (3d Cir.
2010).
15. Bull, 595 F.3d at 991 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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overstated in our post-9/11 society, in which concerns about security and
the constitutional rights of individuals are particularly strong. 16
Recently, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) wrote a letter to
the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC), arguing that a DOC body
cavity search policy at Denver Women’s Correctional Facility violated the
Fourth and Eighth Amendments. 17 Importantly, the letter also discussed
the detrimental impact of the searches on the prisoners’ mental health.18
Female prisoners stated that the invasive searches made them cry and
worsened their prior traumas by causing flashbacks of prior incidents of
sexual abuse. 19 In addition, the letter suggested that the search policy
To support this
threatened prisoners’ successful rehabilitations.20
proposition, the ACLU cited social science sources to argue that
traumatizing body searches will lead prisoners to refuse visits from friends
and family, ultimately making the prisoners’ assimilation into society more
difficult upon release.21
To date, law review articles discuss the constitutionality of strip search
policies in correctional settings under purely legal frameworks. 22 However,
16. Security and civil rights issues are relevant not only in a penological context, but in
emerging debates about national security, technology, and virtual strip searches. See Petition
for Review, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Napolitano, No. 10-1157 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 2010)
(lawsuit filed by a nonprofit organization against the Transportation Security
Administration’s (TSA) full-body scanner program, alleging that the program violates
travelers’ Fourth Amendment rights); see also Susan Stellin, Are Scanners Worth the Risk?,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, (Travel) at 3 (listing the many concerns about body scanners,
including their radiation levels, lack of thorough testing, and ability to save photos of
travelers’ bodies); Gary Stoller, Debate Rages Over Full-Body Scans, USA TODAY, July 13,
2010, at 4B (discussing the growing opposition to TSA scanners that “strip-search”
passengers without probable cause to do so). Furthermore, the advent of new technologies
such as full body scanners allows correctional institutions and airports to conduct similar
searches and cooperate with each other in doing so. See Christina M. Wright, Correctional
Facility Uses Donated Airport Scanners to Detect Drugs, THE HERALD BULL. ONLINE (June
24, 2010), http://heraldbulletin.com/local/x1617562558/Correctional-facility-uses-donatedairport-scanners-to-detect-drugs (reporting that, after getting new equipment, the TSA
donated seven machines that analyze microscopic particles from clothing and skin to the
Indiana Department of Corrections).
17. Letter from the Am. Civil Liberties Union to Ari Zavaras, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep’t of
Corr. 2 (Aug. 23, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Zavaras_ACLU_8-2310.pdf [hereinafter ACLU Letter].
18. See id. at 2–3.
19. See id. (quoting a self-identified survivor of sexual trauma who stated that the strip
searches encouraged her post-traumatic stress disorder and flashbacks, and that she observed
women cry during searches); id. at 3 (“Prisoners at [Denver Women's Correctional Facility
(DWCF)] have complained that the new breed of search exacerbates prior sexual
trauma . . . .”).
20. See id. at 3.
21. See id. at 3 & nn.10–11 (citing various criminal justice, criminology, and therapy
sources).
22. See, e.g., Andrew A. Crampton, Stripped of Justification: The Eleventh Circuit’s
Abolition of the Reasonable Suspicion Requirement for Booking Strip Searches in Prisons,
57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 893, 893–909 (2009) (discussing the history leading up to Powell v.
Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th. Cir. 2008); the decision itself; and post-Powell reactions from
other circuits); Deborah L. MacGregor, Stripped of All Reason? The Appropriate Standard
for Evaluating Strip Searches of Arrestees and Pretrial Detainees in Correctional Facilities,
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merely considering case law and legal standards ignores the very personal
experiences and reactions of the detainees who are searched. Strip
searches, even when conducted professionally and privately, often cause
feelings of disgust, annoyance, trauma, and humiliation, similar to the
experiences of victims of sexual abuse and rape. 23 Although prior legal
articles rely only on judicial precedents, an objective analysis need not
exclude detainees’ responses to strip searches. Accordingly, this Note
discusses the unresolved circuit split on blanket strip search policies in jails
and prisons (when applied to pretrial detainees). Moreover, this Note
introduces into the literature extralegal factors relevant to such policies,
including the psychological and social effects of strip searches. This
information will allow courts and others to reflect on strip searches not only
as a means of preventing contraband in correctional institutions, but also as
a potential form of power, control, and sexual violence systematically
perpetrated by corrections officers. 24
Part I of this Note provides a legal and social science background of strip
search policies by discussing major Fourth Amendment cases,
interdisciplinarity in the law, and social science research on strip searches.
Next, Part II explores the circuit split on the constitutionality of blanket
strip searches, describing the arguments for and against blanket policies.
Part III assesses the opposing views of strip search policies in the context of
relevant case law and social science literature. It argues that, because the
intrusion posed by a strip search is so severe, strip searches should only be
conducted when a police or corrections officer reasonably suspects that a
detainee is concealing contraband. The justification for a strip search must
be compelling enough to substantiate such an invasive procedure, and
anything less than a reasonable suspicion should be considered insufficient.
I. STRIP SEARCHES OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES: THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES
Part I discusses case law and social science findings regarding strip
search policies. Part I.A focuses on the law of strip searches, beginning
with the Fourth Amendment and its protections. It then discusses the only
U.S. Supreme Court case involving blanket strip searches of pretrial
detainees, Bell v. Wolfish, 25 and the Court's subsequent cases involving
detainees' constitutional rights. Next, Part I.B explains interdisciplinarity
and considers its application in the legal field with specific examples from
anthropology, family law, and community development. Part I.B concludes
by discussing the Supreme Court’s approach to interdisciplinarity. Finally,
Part I.C discusses the social science research on strip searches, including

36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 163, 178–83 (2003) (arguing that courts should evaluate the
constitutionality of strip search policies by combining the standards articulated in Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. See infra Part I.C.
25. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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the effects of strip searches on individuals and the potential for abusive
searches.
A. The Law Governing Strip Searches of Pretrial Detainees
Part I.A provides a legal background of the constitutionality of strip
search policies. Part I.A.1 defines the term “strip search” as used in this
Note. Part I.A.2 discusses the Fourth Amendment and its protections,
particularly involving searches of arrestees. Next, Part I.A.3 examines
Bell’s analysis of the constitutionality of blanket strip searches of pretrial
detainees. Finally, Part I.A.4 considers two Supreme Court cases decided
after Bell: Block v. Rutherford 26 and Turner v. Safley. 27
1. Definition of “Strip Search”
A strip search is “[a] search of a person conducted after that person’s
clothes have been removed, the purpose usu[ally] being to find any
contraband the person might be hiding.” 28 Strip searches generally do not
involve scrutiny of body cavities.29 However, policies in correctional
facilities tend to include visual body cavity searches under the broad term
“strip searches,” and only distinguish between visual and physical body
cavity searches. 30 This definitional problem is aggravated when courts
describe strip search policies without clarifying whether a search includes a
visual search of body cavities. 31
In this Note, the term “strip search” refers to non-physical searches in
which an individual removes all of his/her clothes while observed by a law
enforcement officer, whether there is a visual body cavity search or not.32
The stated purpose for the removal of clothing is irrelevant. Thus, for
example, in Wood v. Hancock County Sheriff’s Department, 33 the county
argued that corrections officers only required Wood to disrobe in order to
search his clothing, and “any observation of Wood’s naked body was
26. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
27. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
28. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1469 (9th ed. 2009).
29. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 259 (2010).
30. See, e.g., Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 968 n.4 (9th Cir.
2010). The written policy at issue said: “Strip searches include a visual body cavity search.
A strip search does not include a physical body cavity search.” Id.
31. See, e.g., Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d 153, 154 (5th Cir. 1985) (simply
stating that Class C misdemeanants “were strip searched at the Lubbock County jail pursuant
to jail policy,” without providing the text of the policy or describing what the search entails).
32. See Kelsey v. Cnty. of Schoharie, 567 F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The term ‘strip
search’ is used generally to describe any inspection of the naked body.”). Although a search
involving disrobing and a manual body cavity search is also a strip search, the definition of
“strip search” in this Note excludes manual body cavity searches. Case law suggests that
such searches may undergo a different legal analysis. See 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 1543 (2005) (“Because of the special insult to human dignity involved when the police
seek evidence in body apertures . . . , special rules restrict internal body searches, and if the
bodily intrusion is conducted by means so patently abusive as to shock the conscience, the
search may violate due process.”).
33. 354 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2003).
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incidental.” 34 Nevertheless, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held, the intrusion into individual privacy stems from having one’s
naked body shown to and scrutinized by an official, regardless of the stated
purpose for such exposure. 35 In defining a “strip search,” this Note shares
the view of the First Circuit that requiring an individual to stand naked
before a law enforcement official meets the definition of a “strip search,”
regardless of the official’s intentions.36
2. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches by
limiting the government’s ability to conduct searches. 37 The text of the
Fourth Amendment states, in relevant part: “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” 38
The Fourth Amendment was “designed ‘to prevent arbitrary and
oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and
personal security of individuals.’” 39 Although courts initially construed the
Amendment as protecting property interests rather than persons, they later
found that it primarily safeguards individuals against invasions of privacy.40
a. The Scope of Protection Afforded by the Fourth Amendment
Having established that the Fourth Amendment protects persons, the next
step is to consider the scope of protection available. In Katz v. United
States, 41 the Supreme Court held that people are free from unreasonable
searches and seizures regardless of their location. 42 In his oft-cited
concurrence, Justice John M. Harlan agreed that the Fourth Amendment

34. Id. at 59.
35. See id. at 63–64. But see Kelsey, 567 F.3d at 63–64 (holding that a county jail’s
clothing exchange policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment because incidentally seeing
detainees’ bodies and genitals during a clothing exchange does not amount to a strip search
or an unreasonable search). However, in her dissent, then Second Circuit Judge Sotomayor
wrote that the majority used the wrong version of facts and ignored key testimony by the
plaintiffs. Id. at 65–67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). She stated that although clothing
exchanges may serve important objectives, they violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional right
against unreasonable searches. Id. at 70–71.
36. Wood, 354 F.3d at 63–64.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
38. Id. The Fourth Amendment has been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, rendering it enforceable against states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
39. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 266 (1990) (stating that historical sources suggest that the Fourth Amendment was
meant to protect people from arbitrary actions by the federal government).
40. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42. See id. at 358–59 (holding that the defendant was as entitled to his Fourth
Amendment rights in a telephone booth as a person in a business office, apartment, or
taxicab).
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does not ask where a person is, but rather where a person can reasonably
expect privacy. 43 He articulated a two-prong reasonable expectation of
privacy test: first, a person must have “an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy,” and second, the expectation must be objectively reasonable by
societal standards. 44
In general, police must secure a warrant before conducting a search,45
and probable cause must exist before a warrant can be issued. 46 However,
the Supreme Court has established various exceptions to this rule. 47 For
example, in Terry v. Ohio, 48 the Court upheld warrantless searches based on
less than probable cause as long as the searches are based on specific facts,
not vague hunches or good faith. 49 This is based on the rationale that police
officers engage in “necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the beat.” 50 However, because the purpose of
the Terry exception is to protect police officers and others nearby, the
warrantless search must be limited to looking for potential weapons that can
be used in an assault. 51
b. Searches of Arrestees
In the years after Terry, the Court expanded the exceptions to the warrant
requirement to arrestees and prisoners. In Chimel v. California, 52 the
Supreme Court established that police officers can conduct warrantless
searches of lawfully-arrested persons and areas within their reach. 53 Such
searches are justified by the need to protect the officer, prevent escape, and
prevent the destruction of evidence. 54 The Court in United States v.
Robinson 55 reiterated and clarified this holding, stating that during a lawful
arrest, “a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search
under that Amendment.” 56
In Robinson, the police officer lawfully arrested the respondent,
conducted a pat-down search, and felt an object through the respondent’s
left breast jacket pocket. 57 The officer reached in the pocket and retrieved a
43. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (per curiam).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”).
47. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (stating that a search
incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357
& n.19 (stating that there are “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”
to the warrant requirement, and listing cases).
48. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
49. See id. at 21–22.
50. Id. at 20.
51. Id. at 29.
52. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
53. Id. at 762–63.
54. Id. at 764.
55. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
56. Id. at 235.
57. Id. at 221–23.
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crumpled cigarette package, which contained fourteen capsules of heroin.58
Although the Court stated that such a “full search” is constitutional,59 a
subsequent Supreme Court case made clear that the holding did not apply to
routine strip searches of arrestees.60
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not shied away from cases
involving strip searches of pretrial detainees. Although the Court has
adamantly recognized that prisoners have constitutional protections, it has
also held that the effective administration of prisons allows for some
curtailment of rights. 61
3. Searches of Pretrial Detainees: Bell v. Wolfish
In the 1979 case of Bell v. Wolfish, 62 the Supreme Court considered, for
the first time, whether the Constitution protects pretrial detainees against
strip searches. 63 In Bell, detainees in New York City’s Metropolitan
Correctional Center (MCC) filed a class action lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of over twenty institutional practices, including visual
body cavity searches of inmates after they receive visits.64 Both the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the MCC had to justify its
conditions under a “compelling necessity” standard. 65 The Supreme Court
disagreed, stating it could not find a source in the Constitution for such a
standard. 66
Instead, the Court held that the proper analysis is to determine whether
the conditions at MCC were imposed to punish or to serve a legitimate
governmental purpose.67 Unless there is an express intent to punish, a court
must consider if there is an alternative purpose for the restriction, and if so,
whether the restriction seems excessive given this alternative purpose.68
The Court then held that the government has a legitimate interest in
managing its correctional facilities, which includes maintaining security and

58. Id. at 223.
59. Id. at 235.
60. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 n.2 (1983) (“We . . . do not discuss
here[] the circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be
appropriate.”); see also Katarzyna Homenda, Note, The Court is a Fan of Fans: Johnston v.
Tampa Sports Authority Correctly Refused to Extend the Special Needs Doctrine to PatDowns at Raymond James Stadium, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 775 n.170 (2008) (citing
Robinson in support of the proposition that a full search of a person includes touching under
his/her garments).
61. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974) (holding that “[t]here is no
iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,” but recognizing
that institutional demands may diminish prisoners’ rights).
62. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
63. Id. at 523–24.
64. Id. at 523, 528.
65. Id. at 530.
66. Id. at 532.
67. Id. at 535–38.
68. Id. at 538.
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preventing weapons and drugs from reaching detainees.69 Thus, actions
taken by corrections officers in furtherance of these objectives are valid and
not intended as punishment. 70 Taking this proposition one step further, the
Court held that the need to run a correctional facility effectively can restrict
individual rights. 71 Accordingly, there is no distinction between pretrial
detainees and convicted prisoners, because the nature of incarceration
justifies depriving both groups of their full set of constitutional rights.72
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the judiciary must defer to
corrections officers and policies:
[T]he problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections
facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators
therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security. “Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and
professional expertise of corrections officials . . . .” 73

However, the Court qualified that courts should default to their own
judgment in cases with “substantial evidence . . . that the officials have
exaggerated their response to these considerations.”74
The Court then addressed the constitutionality of various MCC practices,
including a policy requiring a visual inspection of detainees’ body cavities
after every contact visit with a person from outside MCC. 75 In determining
whether such a search is reasonable, the Court applied a balancing test and
weighed the necessity of the search against the invasion of personal
rights. 76 It listed four factors to consider: “the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating
it, and the place in which it is conducted.” 77
Despite providing these factors, the Court did not clearly apply its
balancing test to the MCC strip search policy. Rather, it recognized that
detention centers have “serious security dangers,” including the possibility
that inmates will smuggle items into the facilities in their body cavities.78
The Court also acknowledged that strip searches are invasive and provide a
potential for abuse by security guards. 79 Then, in an abrupt conclusion,

69. Id. at 540.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 546–47.
72. Id. at 546.
73. Id. at 547–48 (citations omitted) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827
(1974)).
74. Id. at 548. But see id. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the necessity
of imposing limitations on prisoners and detainees, but stating that the majority was “blindly
deferring to administrative judgments on the rational basis for particular restrictions,” which
“is an abdication of an unquestionably judicial function”).
75. Id. at 558 (majority opinion).
76. Id. at 559.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 560; see also infra Part I.C.1.
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Bell held that visual body cavity inspections can be conducted on less than
probable cause, without explaining what level of cause is sufficient to meet
constitutional standards. 80
While the majority made no mention of social science theories or
testimony, both Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens
did so in their dissents. 81 A psychiatrist testified that visual body cavity
searches “placed inmates in the most degrading position possible.”82 This
was consistent with inmates’ testimony that they feared sexual assault and
forwent their personal visits to avoid being searched. 83 There was also
medical testimony that “inserting an object into the rectum is painful,”
difficult, and uses more time and opportunity than inmates have during
contact visits. 84 Moreover, visual searches are unlikely to reveal the
presence of objects in the rectum. 85 Both Justices Marshall and Stevens
agreed that visual body cavity strip searches are unnecessary and
degrading. 86
To date, Bell remains the only Supreme Court case to consider policies
requiring blanket strip searches of pretrial detainees.87 It is not surprising
that the Court’s vague guidelines have caused lower courts to interpret the
case in divergent ways. 88

80. Bell, 520 U.S. at 560. Justice Lewis Powell stated that some cause, such as a
reasonable suspicion, is necessary to justify anal and genital searches. Id. at 563 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that courts
should not consider whether a restriction is punitive, but whether the government’s interests
outweigh individual deprivations. Id. at 564 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice John Paul
Stevens expressed a need for objective criteria, and urged for “careful scrutiny” when
correctional facilities do not distinguish among detainees based on dangerousness. Id. at 588
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 577–78 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 593, 599 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also infra Part I.B.3 (analyzing Supreme Court Justices’ approaches to extralegal
disciplines).
82. Bell, 441 U.S. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 593 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that searches “engender ‘deep degradation’ and ‘terror’ in the inmates”
(quoting United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1977))).
83. Id. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 578 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 577; id. at 599 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2010)
(stating that Bell remains a guiding case for strip search policies). Two years after Bell,
Justice William Rehnquist temporarily stayed a mandate by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit to remand a case, after the Fourth Circuit held that strip searches cannot
be conducted without probable cause. Clements v. Logan, 454 U.S. 1304, 1307–09
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1981); see also infra notes 205–12 and accompanying text.
Justice Rehnquist reiterated Bell’s holding that probable cause or a weapons- or drug-related
arrest was not necessary to justify a strip search. Clements, 454 U.S. at 1309–10. However,
the Supreme Court later denied the application for stay and vacated Justice Rehnquist’s
order. Clements v. Logan, 454 U.S. 1117 (1981).
88. See infra Part II.
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4. Supreme Court Cases after Bell
The Supreme Court has not addressed strip search policies in detention
facilities after Bell, but the Court has deviated from Bell’s four-factor
balancing test in deciding subsequent cases involving detainees’
constitutional rights. In Block v. Rutherford, 89 pretrial detainees at the Los
Angeles County Central Jail argued that several jail policies, including a
blanket prohibition on contact visits, violated their substantive due process
rights. 90 After emphasizing the importance of deferring to institutional
practices designed to maintain security and order,91 the Court upheld the
prohibition because it rationally related to internal security. 92
Three years later, the Court in Turner v. Safley93 also used a rational
relationship test, stating that “when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.” 94 Four factors must be
considered in deciding whether a reasonable relationship exists: first,
whether the government objective is legitimate and neutral, rather than
arbitrary and remote; second, whether alternative means exist through
which inmates can exercise their rights; third, the impact of accommodating
these rights on guards, other inmates, and prison resources; and fourth, the
absence of ready alternatives. 95 These factors differ from those in Bell, and
so it remains unclear what test applies when evaluating the constitutionality
of policies in correctional facilities.96 The circuit courts still apply Bell to
blanket strip search policies in jails and prisons, but reach different
conclusions despite interpreting the same case and using the same balancing
test. 97
B. Law and Interdisciplinarity
Part I.A discussed the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment in regards to arrestees, pretrial detainees, and policies in
correctional facilities. However, relying solely on a legal perspective is
insufficient for a thorough analysis of the constitutionality of strip searches,
which are inherently personal experiences. The study of law has been
criticized for its “traditional preoccupation with doctrine,” and “accused of
being rigid, dogmatic, formalistic, and close-minded.” 98 On the other hand,
interdisciplinary work has been “dismissed as substandard, superficial, and
89. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
90. Id. at 578.
91. Id. at 584–85 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 547).
92. Id. at 586.
93. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
94. Id. at 89.
95. Id. at 89–90.
96. See generally MacGregor, supra note 22, at 168–78 (reviewing in more detail other
Supreme Court cases involving prisoners’ rights).
97. See infra Part II.
98. Douglas W. Vick, Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y
163, 181 (2004).
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ill-informed,” and interdisciplinary researchers have been called “‘ivory
tower dilettantes.’” 99 This section begins by defining and presenting the
arguments for and against interdisciplinarity. Next, Part I.B.2 discusses
interdisciplinarity in the field of law and presents relevant examples.
Finally, Part I.B.3 explores Supreme Court decisions that have considered
extralegal disciplines.
1. Interdisciplinarity: Definitions, Advocates, and Critics
A discipline is “a ‘comparatively self-contained and isolated domain of
human experience which possesses its own community of experts’ who
share a distinctive set of ‘goals, concepts, facts, tacit skills, and
methodologies.’” 100 As such, a discipline has both scholarly and social
traits, with its own body of knowledge, as well as members who share
similar histories, goals, traditions, values, and ways of thinking and
communicating. 101 Because each discipline has a distinct identity,
disciplines want to “protect their territories” and “preserve their traditions
. . . into posterity.” 102
Although the categorization of knowledge into disciplines has endured
from ancient Greece to now, disciplines themselves have changed and
evolved over time. 103 As disciplines specialized and grew apart from each
other, scholars expressed the need for interdisciplinarity, though no clear
consensus exists on how interdisciplinarity is defined or why it is
necessary. 104 Generally, interdisciplinarity is not merely a “transplant[] of
methodology from one discipline to another,” though this occurs
occasionally, but involves scholars considering a problem from the
viewpoints of different disciplines. 105
Advocates have listed numerous benefits to interdisciplinarity. Some are
merely practical, such as allowing scholars to distinguish themselves in
competitive academic environments, get published in more prestigious
journals, or secure research grants. 106 More generally, collaboration
promotes the creative combination of ideas and tools from different fields

99. Id. at 186 (quoting Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992)).
100. Id. at 166 (quoting Moti Nissani, Fruits, Salads, and Smoothies: A Working
Definition of Interdisciplinarity, 29 J. EDUC. THOUGHT 121, 122 (1995)).
101. Id. at 166–68.
102. Id. at 169.
103. Id. at 166, 172.
104. Id. at 164–65 (discussing different definitions and descriptions of the term
“interdisciplinarity”); see also JOE MORAN, INTERDISCIPLINARITY 15 (2002) (arguing that the
ambiguity of the term “interdisciplinary” reflects its “flexibility and indeterminacy”).
105. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Pittsburgh, City of Bridges: Developing a Rational
Approach to Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 199, 200 (2004)
(discussing the development of a multidisciplinary discourse involving law, society, and
economics). However, when disciplines mix together successfully, the mixture may be
routine and thus no longer considered interdisciplinary. Vick, supra note 98, at 172–73.
106. Vick, supra note 98, at 171.
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when tackling complex societal problems. 107 Interdisciplinary approaches
can challenge outdated theories, produce innovative theories and methods,
and foster creativity. 108
Certainly, interdisciplinarity also poses challenges.
The term
“interdisciplinarity” is vague and can be manipulated.109 A practical
manifestation of this problem occurs when universities downsize and cut
costs by changing or merging disciplines, and then claim that the changes
were made to embrace interdisciplinarity. 110 Moreover, differences
between disciplines, including different vocabularies and approaches to
practice, may make it difficult to understand and assess the credibility of
research across disciplines. 111 For example, social scientists regularly
critique each other’s methodologies, analyses, and conclusions in peer
evaluations. 112 However, this process may be construed by those outside
the social sciences as criticism of weak research. 113
2. Applying Interdisciplinarity in Law
Law is a unique discipline that does not rely on experimentation and
quantitative data to discover new knowledge. 114 Instead, law is created,
interpreted, and enforced by lawyers, courts, and legislatures. 115 Advocates
of interdisciplinarity in law believe that merely considering the law is not
enough. 116 Rather, they argue, lawyers need to look to the social sciences
and evaluate how legal institutions affect society and public values.117 On
the other hand, some scholars feel that law must be clear and that
complicating legal doctrines with other disciplines will undermine the law
by fostering uncertainty. 118

107. Emily Bruusgaard et al., “Are We All on the Same Page?”: The Challenges and
Charms of Collaboration on a Journey Through Interdisciplinarity, 7 GRADUATE J. SOC. SCI.
39, 43 (2010); see also id. at 44 (emphasizing flexibility and openness in interdisciplinary
collaboration).
108. MORAN, supra note 104, at 182.
109. Id. at 182–84.
110. Id.
111. Bruusgaard et al., supra note 107, at 43.
112. Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the Courts: The Role of Amicus Curiae
Briefs, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 4–5 (1991).
113. Id. at 5. But see Vick, supra note 98, at 185 (stating that people may believe that
scientific studies involving numbers are more conclusive than other studies).
114. Vick, supra note 98, at 177–79 (stating that the law is a closed system that requires
considering only a finite group of authorities).
115. See id. at 177–78 (stating that lawyers primarily study what judges, juries, and other
decision makers have done, then manipulate and present their cases according to those
decisions).
116. Id. at 183.
117. Id. (discussing that legislators also may look to the social sciences in bringing about
legal reforms).
118. See, e.g., Geoffrey Samuel, Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should
Law Be Taken Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists?, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 431, 437
(2009).
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One worry about interdisciplinarity is that it may weaken the field of law
or merge legal and nonlegal scholarship, 119 which has occurred in
anthropology. 120 However, this is unlikely to occur because the legal field
has a strong and stable disciplinary identity. 121 As a result, other
disciplines necessarily have a limited effect in the legal realm because laws
can be repealed or changed. 122 Moreover, written case law and rules guide
the interpretation of laws, so weak or wrong interpretations can be refused
or otherwise ignored. 123
Still, judges and other legal scholars may be reluctant to rely on nonlegal
disciplines because of the law’s sole emphasis on legal precedent, and
because of unfamiliarity with social science methodologies and statistics.124
However, the successful implementation of interdisciplinary approaches in
various legal forums undermines the hesitation of skeptical judges and
scholars. For example, in 1969, legal anthropologist Klaus-Friedrich Koch
wrote about the relevance of anthropological research in three areas of law:
the law of newly independent nations, laws in our contemporary American
society, and international law.125 He concluded that lawyers must go
beyond case law and statutes, and cooperate with social scientists to render
law “an effective instrument of deliberate and guided change.” 126
Another successful implementation of interdisciplinarity in law is the use
of social science research on wills and people’s estate distribution plans in
intestacy and family law. 127 Yet another example is the integration of law
and social science in academia and training. Fordham University’s
graduate law and social work programs created an interdisciplinary
domestic violence course.128 Researchers concluded that, compared with
students who did not enroll in the class, students in the course increased
their knowledge about domestic violence, harbored fewer myths and
stereotypes about domestic violence, and showed increased positive
attitudes about interdisciplinary work. 129 The researchers noted that
domestic violence is by nature “a complicated, multisystem problem, and
one profession cannot be expected to have all the knowledge and skills to

119. Vick, supra note 98, at 186–87.
120. Samuel, supra note 118, at 440 (stating that anthropology has been described as
losing its identity as a distinct discipline).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 439.
123. Id. at 441.
124. See Roesch et al., supra note 112, at 3.
125. Klaus-Friedrich Koch, Law and Anthropology: Notes on Interdisciplinary Research,
4 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 17–21 (1969).
126. Id. at 20.
127. See Monica K. Johnson & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Using Social Science to Inform
the Law of Intestacy: The Case of Unmarried Committed Partners, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
479, 480, 497 (1998) (stating that such research can reach policymakers and, through them,
change the legal and social climate for unmarried committed partners and their families).
128. Lisa Colarossi & Mary Ann Forgey, Evaluation Study of an Interdisciplinary Social
Work and Law Curriculum for Domestic Violence, 42 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 307, 307 (2006).
129. Id. at 318. However, the authors of the article recognized that there could be a
selection bias. Id. at 319–20.
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Thus, they concluded,
intervene in a multidimensional way.” 130
professions should learn to work with each other to assist clients
effectively, holistically, and readily, without being anxious about losing
their identities or failing to dominate over other disciplines.131
As a final example, interdisciplinary collaboration also occurs in the
Middle East to help communities end war. 132 Both law and social work are
concerned about relationships, rights, and responsibilities, but law on its
own may “disregard the everyday life experiences of individuals and
communities that can be very different from acceptable norms as created by
the State.” 133 Because social work deals with individuals and communities
deprived of their basic rights, social workers help when lawyers alone
cannot organize communities against oppressive conditions.134
Interdisciplinary practice centers in Israel, Palestine, and Jordan rely on the
expertise of lawyers, social workers, doctors, accountants, and other
professionals to attain goals such as teaching Islamic women about their
rights, ensuring clean drinking water, and setting up food cooperatives.135
3. Interdisciplinarity in Supreme Court Case Law
As early as 1908, the Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon 136 relied on
social science data to decide the constitutionality of limiting the number of
hours that females work. 137 Attorney (and later-Supreme Court Justice)
Louis Brandeis submitted a brief compiling economics-based arguments
along with reports and statistics of domestic and European committees,
hygiene commissioners, and factory inspectors stating that long hours of
labor were dangerous for women. 138 While the Supreme Court recognized
that these “may not be, technically speaking, authorities” in the legal field,
they were still “worthy of consideration.” 139
Since Muller, numerous cases have included social science briefs,
including cases on the death penalty, homosexuality, abortion, jury size, the
rights of mentally ill individuals, violent video games, and disparaging
trademarks. 140 Courts may be more open to an amicus curiae brief than to a
130. Id. at 320.
131. Id.
132. See Merav Moshe Grodofsky, The Contribution of Law and Social Work to
Interdisciplinary Community Development and Peace Building in the Middle East, 15 J.
COMMUNITY PRAC. 45 (2007).
133. Id. at 51.
134. Id. at 52.
135. Id. at 53–58.
136. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
137. Id. at 417.
138. Id. at 419 n.1. Legal briefs that contain extralegal analyses of statistics and other
sources have become known as “Brandeis briefs” after Muller. See Danaya C. Wright, The
Logic and Experience of Law: Lawrence v. Texas and the Politics of Privacy, 15 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 409–17 (2004) (providing a history of the Brandeis brief).
139. Muller, 208 U.S. at 420–21.
140. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. and
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders in Support of Respondents, Christian Legal Soc’y
Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL
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social scientist’s expert testimony because experts are hired by a party to
testify, while brief writers are unpaid, usually work as a team with other
groups or organizations, and cite their sources. 141
The Supreme Court has gone beyond briefs to directly cite both legal and
nonlegal sources relying on social science research. 142 A well-known
example is Brown v. Board of Education, 143 in which the Court cited six
psychology sources which found that segregation promotes feelings of
inferiority and is detrimental to children’s educational and mental
development. 144 More recently, in Maryland v. Craig, 145 the Court, in
holding that face-to-face confrontation of a child witness may cause
significant emotional distress, relied on academic literature on the
psychological trauma of child witnesses.146
Sometimes, Supreme Court Justices show skepticism towards the social
sciences. For example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1,147 the Court held that basing admissions
decisions in part on students’ race in order to have a diverse student body
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.148
Although the plurality opinion did not cite social science sources, it
discussed earlier cases, including Brown, when the Court referenced
psychological findings. 149 However, Justice Thomas in his concurrence—
though citing some nonlegal sources on student achievement in minority
schools—stated that relying on social science evidence “would leave our
equal protection jurisprudence at the mercy of elected government officials
evaluating the evanescent views of a handful of social scientists.” 150 He
argued that Justice Breyer’s dissent overemphasized social science and
989697 (homosexuality); Brief of Social Scientists, Medical Scientists, & Media Effects
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 3697191 (violent video games);
Brief of Psychology Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Harjo v. ProFootball, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 631 (2009) (No. 09-326), 2009 WL 3359185 (disparaging
trademarks); Roesch et al., supra note 112, at 1–2 (collecting cases with social science briefs
on the other topics).
141. Roesch et al., supra note 112, at 4.
142. See Linda R. Tropp et al., The Use of Research in the Seattle and Jefferson County
Desegregation Cases: Connecting Social Science and the Law, 7 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES &
PUB. POL’Y 93, 94 (2007) (stating that the Supreme Court relied on social science research
on sex role stereotyping in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) and on the
beneficial effects of student body diversity in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).
143. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144. Id. at 494 & n.11 (citing books and psychology journal articles from the 1940s and
1950s on the effects of discrimination and segregation).
145. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
146. Id. at 855 (citing an amicus curiae brief by the American Psychological Association
(APA) and a conference paper presented at an APA conference).
147. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
148. Id. at 711, 735.
149. Id. at 746 (discussing Brown’s holding that race-based segregation denotes
inferiority, as well as other cases involving government classifications that “contribut[e] to
an escalation of racial hostility and conflict” and “demean[] the dignity and worth of a
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities”).
150. Id. at 763, 766 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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“would constitutionalize today’s faddish social theories” on segregation
when the Constitution operates independent of such theories.151 Similarly,
Justice Kennedy expressed concern that the dissent’s reliance on its
“general conclusions . . . have no principled limit and would result in the
broad acceptance of governmental racial classifications in areas far afield
from schooling.” 152 In addressing these criticisms, Justice Breyer noted
that “[i]f we are to insist upon unanimity in the social science literature
before finding a compelling interest, we might never find one.”153
Psychologists agree with Justice Breyer on the impossibility of having
unanimous and completely objective social science findings. 154 They
reason that social scientists, like everyone else, hold societal norms and
standards which inevitably influence their theories.155 They “emphasize
that recognizing some degree of subjectivity in our decision-making
processes need not diminish the rigor of our work or the sound reasoning
that underlies the conclusions we draw.” 156 Rather, social scientists
should allow [them]selves to be continually inspired by [their] morals,
ethics, and values. Indeed, it could be argued that the judiciary is
successful precisely because it celebrates the best of these elements as it
allows voices from the community to have input at the societal level.
Thus, rather than attempting to eliminate values and subjectivity from
[their] decision-making processes, [social scientists] should continue to
ask [them]selves how [they] can thoughtfully and meaningfully blend the
two. 157

Supreme Court Justices may feel differently about integrating social
science into their decision-making processes. However, their divergent
opinions will not stop social scientists from continuing to express their
views and research findings in amicus curiae briefs and scholarly journals.
C. The Social Sciences on Strip Searches
Given that there may be a place in the law for social science, Part I.C
discusses the social science research on strip searches. 158 Part I.C.1 begins

151. Id. at 780.
152. Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 845 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Tropp et al., supra note 142, at 113.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 114. Moreover, social scientists maintain that advocacy does not diminish
science and research: “[A] truly neutral brief is an elusive if not an impossible goal. . . . It is
possible to be scientific without being neutral, to be objective yet form an opinion about the
implications of the research.” Roesch et al., supra note 112, at 7.
158. The research discussed in this section, and generally in this Note, only focuses on
the effects of strip searches as conducted according to the policies in correctional facilities,
assuming officers do not abuse their power in conducting the searches. However, the
potential for abuse exists and is a factor that courts may take into account when deciding the
constitutionality of corrections officers strip searching all individuals upon arrest. See ALLEN
J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS
REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008–09, at 23–24 (2010) (finding that at least four of every ten
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by considering the general effects of strip searches on individuals, then
discusses the targeted use of strip searches as a vehicle for racial
discrimination. Part I.C.2 considers the particular problems that strip
searches create among females. Finally, in light of courts’ deference to
institutional settings like prisons and jails, Part I.C.3 examines the effects of
implementing policies and routines in institutional settings like prisons and
jails.
There is a paucity of social science research on the prevalence and effects
of strip searches on detainees in the United States. Consequently, this
section primarily focuses on studies conducted in Canada, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom. These studies are pertinent to the inquiry in this Note
because the criminal justice policies at issue are similar to policies of
American law enforcement agencies. 159
Several reasons have been posited to explain the lack of research: it is
difficult to scrutinize police treatment of suspects in custody; 160 detainees
may not report abuse out of fear or because of limited financial
resources; 161 and detainees may not want to relive the experience of a strip
search. 162 One woman stated: “It was just the most horrifying thing that I
have ever gone through and I could not tell my husband. I could not tell my
family, I couldn’t tell anyone. It was such a traumatic thing to me I
couldn’t even talk about it.” 163
Moreover, police precincts and correctional institutions withhold
information from the public. 164 There is little evidence of what occurs in
correctional facilities, and the public typically only notices when egregious
violations of individual rights are documented. For example, in 1994, an
emergency response team in the Kingston Prison for Women in Ontario,
Canada, strip searched female inmates during a riot.165 Because the

victims of sexual misconduct by prison staff reported being sexually touched during a strip
search or pat down).
159. Strip search policies are also a matter of concern for courts of other countries. The
Canadian Supreme Court held that strip searches are “inherently humiliating and degrading”
no matter how they are carried out, and therefore cannot be used routinely. R. v. Golden,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, para. 90 (Can.).
160. See Tim Newburn et al., Race, Crime and Injustice?: Strip Search and the
Treatment of Suspects in Custody, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 677, 679 (2004).
161. See Kyle Kirkup, Indocile Bodies: Gender Identity and Strip Searches in Canadian
Criminal Law, 24 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 107, 114 (2009) (stating that these problems are
especially prevalent in minority populations, given the gross power imbalance between them
and the police).
162. M. Margaret McKeown, Strip Searches Are Alive and Well in America, 12 HUM.
RTS. 37, 42 (1985) (stating that detainees may not even tell their families about their
experiences after being strip searched).
163. Id.
164. See MAEVE MCMAHON, WOMEN ON GUARD: DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT IN
CORRECTIONS 178 n.6 (1999); see also James Barron, Times Sues City Police, Saying
Information Has Been Illegally Withheld, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at A29 (stating that the
New York Times sued the New York Police Department for violating a state Freedom of
Information Law that requires the Department to provide information to the press and
public).
165. See MCMAHON, supra note 164, at 178 n.5.
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searches were videotaped, there was extensive media and public attention
which led to the establishment of a royal commission that examined related
events at the prison. 166 It is “suspect[ed] that if the videotape had not
existed, or had not been made public, the incidents and their context would
have, as is more generally the case, escaped systematic scrutiny.” 167
1. The Effects and Discriminatory Use of Strip Searches
Being strip searched leaves people disgusted and annoyed, or worse,
degraded, humiliated, and paralyzed. 168 Victims may feel helpless,
indignant, and shocked, and may experience, for several years,
psychological symptoms of trauma similar to those endured by rape
survivors. 169 Even in prisons where inmates are strip searched so regularly
that prison staff thought that inmates “got used to it,” the reality for many is
that searches become “increasingly hard to bear,” and “serve[] a symbolic
function of reaffirming imprisonment, shame, and lack of status.”170
Feelings of humiliation and helplessness may be amplified if an arrestee
exhibits physical manifestations of an illness or hormonal change, such as
females who are lactating 171 or menstruating, 172 or arrestees who are
otherwise perceived as different, including transgendered individuals. 173
One study on the role of closed circuit television in a London police
station emphasizes the potential for abuse and discrimination when police
officers have discretion to strip search detainees.174 From May 1999 to

166. Id. at 178 n.6.
167. Id.
168. See McKeown, supra note 162, at 37, 42; see also RUSSELL P. DOBASH ET AL., THE
IMPRISONMENT OF WOMEN 204 (1986) (stating that female prisoners in Scotland felt that the
benefits of receiving visits were outweighed by their feelings of degradation and humiliation
after body searches).
169. McKeown, supra note 162, at 42 (“Post-search symptoms include sleep disturbance,
recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event, inability to concentrate, anxiety, depression
and development of phobic reactions.”).
170. DOBASH ET AL., supra note 168, at 204–05.
171. See Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that the
plaintiff lactated during the strip search, was not allowed to cover herself and instead was
given a cut maxi-pad by the booking officer and a male jailer, neither of whom used gloves
upon handling the pad).
172. See DOBASH ET AL., supra note 168, at 205; Linda Moore & Phil Scraton, The
Imprisonment of Women and Girls in the North of Ireland: A “Continuum of Violence”, in
THE VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION 124, 128 (Phil Scraton & Jude McCulloch eds., 2009); see
also Jude McCulloch & Amanda George, Naked Power: Strip Searching in Women’s
Prisons, in THE VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION, supra, at 107, 119 (stating that requiring
women to remove their tampons and to squat and cough will not cause items concealed in
the vagina to fall out, and that a contrary belief “reveals either a profound ignorance of
women’s anatomy or an indifference to the stated purpose of strip searches in favour of a
deliberate strategy to humiliate and degrade women”).
173. See Kirkup, supra note 161, at 107 (stating that a preoperative male-to-female
transgendered woman who was arrested and strip searched in Ontario, Canada claimed that
her requests for female officers to conduct the searches were denied and that she was
subjected to a “split search” in which “male officers examined [her] ‘male’ lower body while
female officers inspected her ‘female’ upper body”).
174. Newburn et al., supra note 160, at 679.
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September 2000, officers in the station processed over 7000 arrests.175 The
station’s policy allowed officers of the same sex to conduct strip searches
only if they felt it was necessary to remove drugs or a harmful object.176
For each arrest, the researchers documented the detainee’s age, sex,
ethnicity, and offense.177 A statistical analysis of these factors revealed
that, as expected, people arrested for drug offenses were the most likely to
be strip searched. 178 The results also showed that while all other variables
(age, sex, and offense) were controlled, females were less likely to be strip
searched than males, and arrestees who were seventeen to twenty-three
years old were more likely to be strip searched than other age groups.179 In
addition, ethnicity influenced whether a strip search was conducted even
when all other variables were taken into account. Specifically, compared to
white Europeans, African-Caribbeans were twice as likely to be searched
while Arabics and Orientals were half as likely. 180 The researchers in the
study concluded that the data at least “raise . . . the spectre of police racism”
and reveal that “policing is unequally experienced,” though it is impossible
to determine whether the disproportionate number of strip searches of
African-Caribbeans is due to institutional racism or unintentional
discrimination. 181
2. Strip Searches of Female Inmates
This section discusses the effects of strip searches on female inmates.
While the overall experience of convicted inmates serving a prison sentence
is obviously different from that of an arrestee or pretrial detainee, the
specific effects and psychological reactions of being naked and strip
searched are likely similar among arrestees and inmates. 182

175. Id. at 679–80.
176. Id. at 679.
177. Id. at 681–83.
178. Id. at 688.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 688–89. “White European” referred to “apparently-white British-born
detainees, but may also have been used by the police to refer to someone born, for example,
in Canada, France or Australia.” Id. at 681. Similarly, the study did not distinguish between
black Caribbeans and black Africans. Id. at 680–81 (explaining that ethnic classifications
were based on police assessments of ethnicity, and that although these assessments may be
inaccurate, they reflect the police officers’ perceptions of detainees’ ethnicities which
ultimately influence treatment of the detainees).
181. Id. at 693.
182. An important distinction is that, unlike for arrestees, strip searches of inmates
constitute one part of a total system of control and isolation, and thus may have more
profound, negative effects. See McCulloch & George, supra note 172, at 112–13 (stating that
routine strip searches in prisons discourage female inmates from seeing visitors and
undermine prisons’ attempts to rehabilitate, counsel, and improve women’s self-esteem and
skills). In addition, strip search policies applied to inmates may perpetuate a vicious cycle in
which drug-abusing inmates—who pose the greatest risk of smuggling drugs, syringes, and
other contraband into prisons—may experience powerlessness, lowered self-esteem, mental
anguish, and suicidal thoughts, which increase the need for drugs. Id. at 119–20.
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Strip searches of women have been labeled as sexual violence and
compared to rape. 183 Only in correctional settings can officials claim to
coerce someone into removing their clothing as part of their job, when the
same coercion anywhere else would be a sexual assault. 184 Psychiatrists
have found that survivors of sexual humiliation often feel “shame and selfblame,” which negatively impacts their feelings of “capability and
autonomy.” 185 In addition, female inmates who were strip searched
expressed feeling objectified and deprived of their personhood, like “cattle
in a market.” 186 One woman said that the vulnerability, weakness, and
anger inherent in being naked took away her will to fight back and caused
her to prefer being beaten rather than strip searched. 187 Even if female
prisoners do fight back and resist strip searches, it only makes the search
more violent and reminiscent of a sexual assault, as one prisoner described:
[T]hey literally had to pull the clothes off you. That was embarrassing
because you were kicking and struggling and they were ripping the
clothes completely off you . . . . You felt as if you were nothing, you feel
degraded. It’s like a rape of some kind. They are ripping the bra and the
panties off you [sigh] you felt like crying, you felt like rolling back in a
ball and getting into the corner and never coming out of there again! 188

Being strip searched is particularly traumatizing for conservative,
religious persons 189 and for domestic or sexual abuse survivors. 190 Paula
Richardson, a twenty-three year-old inmate in Australia, was raped several
months before her imprisonment and strip search. 191 Paula called her
mother after the strip search, when she was “inconsolable with distress and
kept saying ‘they’ve done it again, they’ve done it again.’” 192 Paula’s
mental well-being and behavior deteriorated after the search, as evidenced
183. R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, para. 90 (Can.) (stating that strip searches are
described as “visual rape” and victims, particularly women and minorities, may experience a
search as a sexual assault); Begoña Aretxaga, The Sexual Games of the Body Politic:
Fantasy and State Violence in Northern Ireland, 25 CULTURE, MED. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 6
(2001) (stating that the process of strip searching a female political prisoner “inscrib[es] the
body . . . with the meanings of sexual subjugation through a form of violence that
phantasmatically replicates the scenario of rape”); McCulloch & George, supra note 172, at
109 (stating that prisoners experience strip searches “as a form of sexual violence or
coercion”).
184. McCulloch & George, supra note 172, at 109.
185. Id. at 113.
186. Aretxaga, supra note 183, at 15.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 15–16.
189. McCulloch & George, supra note 172, at 114 (discussing the traumatizing effects of
strip searches on Catholic women imprisoned in Northern Ireland). Strip searches were also
used to exploit and bring psychological harm to Muslim/Arab prisoners in Abu Ghraib. Id.
(“Muslim victims of sexual torture forever carry a stigma. . . . [M]erely being stripped naked
implies the breaking of a strict taboo, which leaves victims feeling extremely exposed and
humiliated.”).
190. Id. (stating that strip searches can re-victimize women who were traumatized in
incidents with men in the past); Moore & Scraton, supra note 172, at 128 (stating that
women survivors of domestic abuse experienced additional trauma from strip searches).
191. McCulloch & George, supra note 172, at 116.
192. Id.
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in her prison records and according to prison officials and her parents.193
Six weeks later, she hung herself with a shower curtain in a cell; the coroner
who investigated her death said that the strip search was unnecessary,
invasive, and inappropriate. 194
3. Policies and Routines in Institutional Settings
While no researcher to date has studied the effect of implementing
blanket strip search policies in correctional facilities, a well-known
psychology experiment suggests that such policies may lead to indifference,
mistreatment, and even intentional harassment by officers. 195 The 1973
Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) demonstrated the extraordinary influence
of institutional settings by showing that even self-described college pacifists
would, within hours of pretending to be prison guards, intentionally
mistreat their peers who were pretending to be prisoners.196 Indeed, “the
SPE underscored the degree to which institutional settings can develop a
life of their own, independent of the wishes, intentions, and purposes of
those who run them.” 197 Thus, the environment outweighed the lawabiding nature, caring personalities, and good intentions of the guards.198
Instead, “[r]outines develop[ed]; rules [were] made and applied, altered and
followed without question; policies enacted for short-term convenience
bec[a]me part of the institutional status quo and difficult to alter.”199 The
SPE researchers noted that this applies particularly to prisons, which can
withstand strong pressures for change and escape outside scrutiny of their
day-to-day operations. 200 This view is bolstered by Bell v. Wolfish’s
instruction for courts to afford wide-ranging deference to prison officials
and policies. 201
The SPE researchers argue that because prison settings can skew the
judgments of administrators, people outside the prison system should be
responsible for making institutional changes.202 The researchers call for
psychologists and social scientists to more thoroughly examine social and
policy issues in prisons, discard outdated theories on which criminal justice
193. Id.
194. Id. at 116–17.
195. See Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy:
Twenty-Five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709 (1998).
196. Id. at 710; see also id. at 709 (stating that the guards were so abusive that the twoweek experiment was stopped after six days).
197. Id. at 721.
198. Id. But see generally Thomas Carnahan & Sam McFarland, Revisiting the Stanford
Prison Experiment: Could Participant Self-Selection Have Led to the Cruelty?, 33
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 603 (2007) (finding, in a separate experiment using an
identical ad used to recruit participants for the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE), that
volunteers for the study scored significantly higher on measures of aggressiveness,
authoritarianism, narcissism, and social dominance, and lower on empathy and altruism, thus
suggesting that there may be a selection bias that influenced the outcomes of the SPE).
199. Haney & Zimbardo, supra note 195, at 721.
200. Id.
201. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979).
202. Haney & Zimbardo, supra note 195, at 721.
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practices are based, and develop better alternatives backed by concrete data
and creative ideas.203
II. THE WIDENING CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE REASONABLENESS OF BLANKET
STRIP SEARCH POLICIES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
As Part I discussed, Bell is the only Supreme Court case to date that
specifically addressed the constitutionality of strip search policies involving
pretrial detainees. Part II describes the widening circuit split on this issue,
and begins by discussing cases by eight circuits that interpret Bell to hold
that strip search policies violate the Fourth Amendment. Part II.B analyzes
more recent opinions by three circuits that interpret Bell to hold the
opposite. Finally, Part II.C presents the social science arguments used by
parties and amici curiae in the two most recent circuit court decisions.
A. Blanket Strip Search Policies Violate Fourth Amendment Rights
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that routine strip
searches of pretrial detainees pursuant to correctional policies violate the
Fourth Amendment when there is no individualized suspicion that the
detainees have weapons or contraband. 204
1. The Circuit Courts’ General Bell Analysis
Logan v. Shealy 205 was the first federal appellate court case to hold that a
strip search policy violated the Fourth Amendment. Logan was arrested for
driving while intoxicated and taken to the Arlington County Detention
Center. 206 She was released on her own recognizance but had to wait four
hours before leaving unless someone picked her up.207 Logan was placed
in a holding cell and strip searched pursuant to a policy requiring strip
searches of all persons held at the Detention Center, regardless of their
arrest charge. 208 Within an hour after the search, Logan was released to a
Logan sued, alleging that the strip search policy was
friend. 209
unreasonable and violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.210
The Fourth Circuit held that the Detention Center policy was
unconstitutional under Bell: Logan was not mixed with the general jail
203. Id. at 721–22.
204. See, e.g., Wood v. Hancock Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 354 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2003); Shain
v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1985);
Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1985); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391 (10th
Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983); Dufrin v.
Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1983); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981).
205. 660 F.2d 1007.
206. Id. at 1009.
207. Id. at 1010.
208. Id. The policy was instituted after a misdemeanant who was not strip searched shot
a deputy. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1011.
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population and there was no indication that she had weapons or contraband,
especially because she was not even frisked. 211 The court concluded that
“[a]n indiscriminate strip search policy routinely applied to detainees such
as Logan along with all other detainees cannot be constitutionally justified
simply on the basis of administrative ease in attending to security
considerations.” 212
Other circuits have also relied on a Bell analysis to hold that strip
searches violated arrestees, and detainees’ Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches.213 Most of the cases involve plaintiffs
In
arrested for traffic offenses and non-violent misdemeanors. 214
addressing the first Bell prong, the scope of intrusion,215 several circuits use
strong language to describe the invasiveness of strip searches. For example,
the First Circuit stated that “visual body cavity [strip] searches ‘impinge[d]
seriously upon’ Fourth Amendment values” 216 and constituted “‘an offense
to the dignity of the individual,’” 217 and the Seventh Circuit described
searches as “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying,
unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, [and] signifying degradation and
submission.” 218
In assessing the two Bell factors of the manner and place in which a
search is conducted, courts note that blanket policies generally require
searches to be conducted professionally and privately by officers of the
same sex as the inmate. 219 Thus, strip searches in non-private areas, such

211. Id. at 1013.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Watt v. City of Richardson Police Dep’t, 849 F.2d 195, 196 (5th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing that an analysis of strip search policies both facially and as applied “begins, and
practically ends,” with Bell). But see Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir.
1985) (citing Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir. 1983), for the
proposition that reasonableness cannot be precisely defined or mechanically applied).
214. See, e.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108 (1st Cir. 2001) (police arrested
plaintiff Roberts based on an administrative error for an outstanding warrant which was
actually withdrawn seven months earlier); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 740 (8th Cir.
1985) (plaintiff Jones was arrested on a warrant for refusing a summons after failing to leash
his dog); Stewart, 767 F.2d at 154 & n.1 (stating that approximately one thousand strip
searches were conducted each month pursuant to a blanket jail policy, including strip
searches of a plaintiff arrested for public intoxication and another plaintiff arrested on a
warrant for issuing a bad check); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984)
(plaintiff was arrested on a warrant for a speeding ticket on his way to work at 7:30a.m.);
Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1267 n.2 (three plaintiffs were arrested for traffic offenses and
one plaintiff was arrested for a subsequently-dismissed disorderly conduct charge).
215. See supra text accompanying note 77.
216. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 110 (quoting Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997)).
217. Id. (quoting Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1996)).
218. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (quoting Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 491
(D. Wis. 1979)); see also Jones, 770 F.2d at 742 (describing a strip search as “intrusive,
depersonalizing, and distasteful”).
219. See, e.g., Roberts, 239 F.3d at 113; Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084, 1087 (6th Cir.
1983).
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as a police station hallway, weigh strongly against a holding that blanket
strip search policies are constitutional.220
Finally, courts consider correctional institutions’ justifications for
conducting strip searches. 221 City and county governments state that strip
searches help secure lockups by preventing the smuggling of weapons or
contraband. 222 Although institutional security is a legitimate government
interest, 223 circuit courts have held that the lack of a specific justification
for strip searches outweigh a general interest in institutional security.224
The courts also pointed out instances in which strip searches were blatantly
unnecessary, including when plaintiffs were strip searched multiple
times. 225 Furthermore, though some policies may require strip searches
only if detainees are intermingled with the general prison population, courts
hold that intermingling is merely one factor among many to consider.226
2. Requiring a Case-by-Case Analysis
Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Logan, some circuit courts refrain from
directly holding that a blanket strip search policy is unconstitutional.
Instead, they emphasize that whether a strip search pursuant to jail policies
violates Fourth Amendment rights depends on the circumstances. 227 The
220. See Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1250 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that the plaintiff,
arrested for failing to appear in court after a judge’s administrative error of recording the
wrong court date, was told to open her blouse for inspection in plain view of others and then
strip searched on a different floor); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984)
(stating that Hill was strip searched in the vicinity of almost a dozen people after he had
already been frisked).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
222. See Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272.
223. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111.
224. See, e.g., id. at 111–12 (stating that detainees are unlikely to smuggle contraband
when handcuffed and arrested spontaneously, and further stating that police officers can use
less invasive searches such as a clothing search to look for contraband); see also Shain v.
Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that misdemeanants who remain detained
because they do not post bail usually cannot afford bail, refuse bail, or had family court
issues, and none of these reasons pose a reasonable suspicion that they have weapons or
contraband); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272–73 (holding that the city failed to show that
women arrested for traffic or other minor offenses and who are in the lockups only to await
bail pose severe dangers to the security of the lockups).
225. See Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that
Archuleta was frisked once at the scene of arrest and two more times at the detention facility,
then strip searched even after the booking officer saw that Archuleta lacked the moles and
tattoos described in an arrest warrant and told a receptionist “this isn’t her”); Roberts, 239
F.3d at 108–09 (stating that Roberts was subjected to a visual body cavity strip search which
revealed no contraband, but still underwent a similar search later that day); Jones v.
Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that Jones was subjected to a visual
body cavity strip search at the jail despite the police arresting him from his home and after
going upstairs with him while he dressed and used the bathroom).
226. See Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1254 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that mingling
with prison inmates weighs in favor of heightened security measures, but does not by itself
justify strip searches without considering the offense or whether an arrestee has weapons or
contraband); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984) (similar).
227. See, e.g., Archuleta, 523 F.3d at 1286 & n.5 (declining to adopt a bright-line rule for
constitutional strip searches and requiring more fact-intensive inquiries with at least
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need for a case-by-case analysis is particularly strong if a routine strip
search policy is not carried out consistently. For example, in Bull, despite
being detained in jails that operate under the same detailed guidelines,228
Mary Bull, Leigh Fleming, and Charli Johnson were all subjected to
different procedures and even different types of searches. 229 Similarly,
corrections officers perform body searches in various ways, as detailed in
the ACLU’s letter to the Colorado DOC.230 The DOC’s body cavity search
policy at Denver Women’s Correctional Facility required prisoners to hold
open their labia for inspection. 231 One prisoner stated that officers perform
the procedure differently, so that she has had to undergo the search “simply
standing; from a sitting position with [her] legs spread eagle and having a
flashlight shined at [her] genitals; from a standing position with a foot
perched on a toilet and an officer’s face inches from [her] genitals.” 232
In Watt v. City of Richardson Police Department, 233 the Fifth Circuit
approved a blanket strip search policy facially but held that the policy was
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, Lynda Watt.234 Watt was
arrested on an outstanding warrant for failure to license her dog. 235 She
was cooperative and admitted to a minor drug conviction eleven years
earlier, 236 which the police would not have known about otherwise.237
However, city policy required strip searches of detainees charged with or
having a history of weapons, shoplifting, or drug charges. 238 As a result, a

reasonable suspicion of weapon, drug, or contraband possession); Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255
(holding that while a strip search is objectively reasonable for arrestees charged with violent
crimes, it is not reasonable in traffic violations or other nonviolent minor offenses without
any individualized reasonable suspicion of the arrestee having a weapon or contraband).
228. The written policy in Bull contains thorough instructions such as “[r]aise his/her
arms above their [sic] head and rotate 360 degrees,” and “turn his/her head first to the left
and then to the right so the searching officer can inspect the arrestee’s ear orifices.” Bull v.
City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 968 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010).
229. The first sentence of the policy states that strip searches do not include physical body
cavity searches. Id. However, both Mary Bull and Leigh Fleming alleged that they were
subjected to body cavity searches. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 5.
230. ACLU Letter, supra note 17, at 1–2.
231. See id. at 1.
232. Id. On September 24, 2010, the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) issued
a new regulation that no longer includes labia lifts, but requires women to lift their breasts
and men to “lift genitalia and pull back foreskin of penis.” COLO. DEP’T OF CORR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION NO. 300–06, SEARCHES AND CONTRABAND CONTROL 6 (2010).
Inmates also need to turn their back to DOC officers, squat and cough, then bend forward
and separate their buttocks for inspection. Id.
233. 849 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1988).
234. Id. at 195. Indeed, Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819 (5th Cir. 1996), characterized Watt as
holding that officials can only strip search a minor offender who posts bond if there is a
reasonable suspicion that the detainee has weapons or contraband. Id. at 821. Kelly held that
strip searching a woman arrested for making an illegal turn and driving without a license was
not objectively reasonable. Id. at 822.
235. Watt, 849 F.2d at 196.
236. Id. at 196 & n.2 (stating that the conviction was set aside after Watt completed
sixteen months of probation).
237. Id. at 196. Additionally, police knew that Watt’s release was imminent because she
called her neighbor for bail. Id.
238. Id.
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female officer conducted a visual body cavity inspection of Watt.239
Because the policy targeted specific classes of offenders thought to pose a
threat to prison security, 240 the Fifth Circuit held that it would justify
certain searches. 241 As applied to Watt, however, the court held that the
search was “undeniably offensive” and thus unconstitutional given her
minor offense, cooperative nature, sobriety, and minimal criminal
history. 242
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has also refrained from holding that blanket
strip search policies are per se unconstitutional. In Dufrin v. Spreen,243
Caroline Dufrin was arrested on a warrant for assault. 244 She was taken to
the Oakland County Jail, where she underwent a strip search pursuant to a
jail policy that applied regardless of the offense.245 The court, relying on
Bell, recognized that courts must give “wide-ranging deference” to prison
policies and practices.246 Dufrin was charged with a violent felony and
came in contact with the general jail population.247 The Sixth Circuit
distinguished the case from other circuits that held blanket strip searches
were unconstitutional when they involved minor offenses not usually
associated with weapons and contraband. 248 The court concluded that the
Constitution does not require the sheriff to subjectively decide if a less
intrusive search can be used based on the nature of the offense.249
Accordingly, the court held for the defendant sheriff.250
B. Blanket Strip Searches Do Not Violate Fourth Amendment Rights
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
have held that blanket strip search policies of pretrial detainees, even absent
individualized suspicion, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. These
cases will be discussed in chronological order.
1. Eleventh Circuit
On September 4, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit decided Powell v. Barrett, 251
a class action lawsuit brought by eleven plaintiffs strip searched at a

239. Id.
240. See id. at 197.
241. Id. at 198.
242. Id. at 199.
243. 712 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1983).
244. Id. at 1085.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1087 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1088.
249. Id. at 1089.
250. Id.; see also Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson Cnty., 823 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 1987)
(upholding a strip search because the security interests are even stronger than those in
Dufrin, since plaintiff Dobrowolskyj was arrested for menacing, an offense typically
associated with weapons, and came into contact with the general jail population).
251. 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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Georgia county jail. 252 Five plaintiffs were searched as part of the booking
process upon first entering the jail, even though police had no reasonable
suspicion that any of them had contraband. 253 The charges against the
plaintiffs were revoking bail on a disorderly conduct charge, a traffic ticket
warrant, driving under the influence, contempt for failure to pay child
support, and a non-violent burglary. 254 The Fulton County Jail’s policy
required the arrestees to remove their clothes, take a group shower with
thirty to forty other arrestees, and stand for visual inspections by
deputies. 255
The Eleventh Circuit analyzed the searches under Bell, rejecting the
county and city defendants’ argument that the more deferential Turner v.
Safley standard should apply. 256 The court held that Bell did not interpret
the Fourth Amendment to require individualized reasonable suspicion
because Bell involved a blanket visual body cavity strip search policy, not
individualized searches. 257 Furthermore, Powell held that other circuits that
differentiate between felonies, misdemeanors, and lesser offenses like
traffic violations in justifying strip searches were not faithful to Bell, which
did not distinguish between detainees based on their arrest charges.258 The
court stated that a minor offender may be a gang member attempting to
smuggle contraband into the facility, 259 or someone pulled over in a vehicle
who had enough time to hide contraband on his/her person before an officer
got to the car door. 260 The court concluded that arrestees may be as likely
to conceal contraband as inmates receiving contact visits.261
The Eleventh Circuit further analogized inmates after contact visits to
arrestees during the booking process by stating that “an inmate’s initial
entry into a detention facility might be viewed as coming after one big and
prolonged contact visit with the outside world.” 262 It expressed that the
plaintiffs’ “claims would not have a prayer of surviving even the most
cursory reading of Bell” had they involved strip searches after a contact
visit instead of during booking. 263 The court then held that a blanket strip
search policy applied to arrestees during the booking process did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. 264

252. Id. at 1300.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1301.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1302; see also supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
257. Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307; see also id. at 1309 (stating that upon remand from the
Supreme Court in Bell, the district court in the case must have recognized that reasonable
suspicion was not required for strip searches, and then stating that other courts should
recognize the same).
258. Id. at 1310.
259. Id. at 1311.
260. Id. at 1313.
261. Id. at 1314.
262. Id. at 1313.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1314.
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2. Ninth Circuit
As previously discussed, in Bull, the Ninth Circuit joined the circuit split
created by the Eleventh Circuit.265 Jail administrators in Bull said that
“based on their experience, ‘the greatest opportunity for the introduction of
drugs and weapons into the jail occurs at the point when an arrestee is
received into the jail.’” 266 They also produced evidence that strip searches
at the county jail uncovered seventy-three instances of illegal drugs and
drug paraphernalia in arrestees’ body cavities between April 2000 and April
2005. 267 Drugs, drug paraphernalia, and weapons were found in body
cavities even in cases involving minor non-violent offenses like public
drunkenness and public nuisance. 268
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the county jail policy under the guidance of
Bell and Turner. 269 As in Bell, the strip searches of the plaintiffs were
visual, professional, private, and done so to combat a serious contraband
problem in San Francisco jails.270 The Ninth Circuit found that the facts of
Bull and Bell were not meaningfully distinguishable and thus, respecting
Bell’s mandate of deferring to corrections officials, upheld the strip
searches as constitutional. 271 The court stated that a Turner analysis leads
to the same conclusion since the strip searches are rationally related to the
legitimate governmental interest of keeping contraband out of jails.272
The court then discussed two of its earlier decisions, both of which held
that blanket strip search policies of arrestees were per se unconstitutional,
even if the arrestees were intermingled with the general prison
population. 273 According to the court, these prior decisions were erroneous
for four reasons: (1) the judges substituted their judgment for that of
corrections officials, (2) arrestees should not be distinguished by the
severity of their offenses, (3) counties do not need to demonstrate an
extensive history of smuggling incidents to justify a blanket strip search
policy, and (4) such policies may deter arrestees from concealing
contraband in body cavities. 274 Ultimately, because Bell did not require
individualized reasonable suspicion or statistical evidence to support a
blanket strip search policy, the Ninth Circuit held that the San Francisco
policy is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 275

265. See supra notes 1–13 and accompanying text.
266. Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2010).
267. Id. at 969 (stating that weapons were also found in body cavities).
268. Id. But see id. at 991 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that there was no empirical
evidence that body cavity searches decreased the amount of contraband in jails).
269. Id. at 971 (majority opinion).
270. Id. at 975.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 976.
273. Id. at 977 (discussing Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir.
1989), and Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)).
274. Id. at 978–81.
275. Id. at 982. The Ninth Circuit decided Bull solely on the grounds that a strip search
policy can apply to all arrestees introduced into the general jail population, but not arrestees
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3. Third Circuit
On September 21, 2010, the Third Circuit further widened the circuit
split on the constitutionality of blanket strip search policies in Florence v.
Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington. 276 Plaintiff Albert Florence
was arrested on a bench warrant for an offense punishable by a fine, which
Florence had already paid.277 Florence was strip searched at the Burlington
County Jail, then transported to the Essex County Correctional Facility six
days later, where he showered before two corrections officers and was strip
searched again. 278 Both jails required Florence to lift his genitals, and the
facility in Essex County further required him to squat and cough. 279
The Third Circuit applied Bell’s four-factor balancing test. 280 First, the
strip searches were less intrusive than the visual body cavity searches in
Bell. 281 The searches were conducted in private, under sanitary conditions,
and by professionals. 282 The justifications for the strip searches were
different from those in Bell. 283 Specifically, the jails’ security interests
included detecting and deterring the smuggling of weapons and contraband
into jails, identifying gang members from their tattoos, and preventing
disease. 284 The court held that, of the three, smuggling during intake posed
the greatest security threat and was as strong as the interest in Bell of
preventing smuggling after contact visits. 285 Like the Eleventh and Ninth
Circuits, the court stated that Bell did not require individualized suspicion
and did not differentiate based on detainees’ offenses.286 Rather, the
security risk posed by arrestees was inherent in their detention in a
correctional facility. 287 Furthermore, the court stated that individuals can
plan their arrests in order to smuggle contraband or weapons, especially if
courts forbid searches of certain groups of arrestees. 288 The Third Circuit
thus deferred to and agreed with prison administrators that blanket strip
search policies decrease the subjectivity entailed in requiring reasonable
suspicion to conduct strip searches. 289 The court held that the strip search

charged with minor offenses who remain at police stations. See Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of
San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
276. 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010).
277. Id. at 299. The charges against Florence were ultimately dismissed. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 306; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
281. Florence, 621 F.3d at 307.
282. Id. (discussing the place and manner in which the searches were conducted, two of
the four factors in Bell’s balancing test).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 308. But see id. at 312 (Pollak, J., dissenting) (noting that both counties failed
to present evidence of smuggling problems in their jails).
286. Id. at 308 (majority opinion).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 309.
289. Id. at 310.
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policies in both New Jersey jails were reasonable and did not violate
Florence’s Fourth Amendment rights. 290
C. Social Science Arguments in Briefs
Although most of the briefs submitted to the Courts of Appeals in the
cases discussed in Parts II.A and II.B did not include social science
arguments, the appellant’s opening brief in Bull and several amicus curiae
briefs in Florence referenced social science sources and findings.
In its opening brief in Bull, the City and County of San Francisco argued
that strip searches are necessary regardless of the offense committed
because any arrestee can hide contraband on his/her body or inside bodily
orifices. 291 Moreover, any arrestee, even one charged with prostitution or a
property crime, may be a drug addict, user, or otherwise connected to
drugs. 292 The City cited a research article which found that drug-using
criminals are motivated to commit more crimes because they need money
for drugs. 293
Similarly, two amicus curiae briefs supporting the Burlington County Jail
and Essex County Correctional Facility stressed the dangers that jailors
face. One amicus brief referred to a New Jersey government investigation
of organized criminal street gangs in New Jersey prisons. 294 The report
found that contraband confiscated in New Jersey prisons included drugs,
weapons, cell phones, SIM cards, and money. 295 The brief stated that not
allowing jailors to identify gang members hinders their ability to safeguard
the facilities. 296
The Policemen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) also discussed the
importance of identifying gang members and keeping rival gangs away
from each other. 297 Citing the defendants-appellants’ brief, the PBA stated
that identifying tattoos is a simple and reliable method of finding gang
affiliations. 298 They also listed a medical justification for strip searches,
namely, to detect contagious diseases that manifest with abscesses, boils,
and other external symptoms. 299 The PBA concluded that not allowing

290. Id. at 312.
291. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 15–19, Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d
964 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 06–15566), 2007 WL 1302885.
292. Id. at 18.
293. Id. at 18–19 (citing ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL,
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN CRIME 25 (1972); Joseph A. Califano, Op-Ed., A National
Attack on Addiction is Long Overdue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1986, at A35).
294. Brief of Sheriff’s Ass’n of New Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Defendants-Appellants’ Brief on Appeal at 20, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of
Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-3603, 09-3661), 2009 WL 5635568.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n, Local 249 at 13,
Florence, 621 F.3d 296 (Nos. 09-3603, 09-3661), 2009 WL 5635567.
298. Id. at 13.
299. Id. at 15.
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strip searches leads to the “unconscionable” result of risking the health,
safety, and welfare of corrections officials. 300
In contrast to the amicus curiae briefs for the defendants-appellants in
Florence, a brief in support of plaintiff-appellee Albert Florence extensively
discussed the psychological impact of strip searches on detainees.301 The
Pennsylvania Prison Society (PPS) stated that the Third Circuit must begin
its analysis by considering “the unique emotional and psychological
ramification of forcing arrestees to remove all clothing and be visually
inspected by a stranger.” 302 After citing Supreme Court case law on the
unique protections given to an individual’s interests in bodily privacy and
integrity, the PPS noted that any detainee can experience the indignity of
The
strip searches if reasonable suspicion is not required.303
“dehumanizing search” may impact victims in the long-term as they
experience sleeping problems, flashbacks, and other symptoms of
psychological disorders. 304 In addition, “strip searches can have an
irreversible effect on personal identity: ‘a systematic deprivation of privacy
and dignity can weaken the individual’s sense of self’ . . . [which] may have
the unintended consequence of ‘increas[ing] violent and irrational
behavior.’” 305 The PPS concluded its brief with a quote from The Brothers
Karamazov about the feelings of degradation, awkwardness, guilt, and
despicableness a character felt when forced to undress during an
interrogation. 306 Finally, the PPS referred again to the psychological
effects of strip searches:
This transcendent principle of our humanity—that strip searches are tools
for humiliation and dehumanization—is that which animates the current
state of constitutional law. . . . [W]e respectfully urge this Court to join
the overwhelming majority of federal courts in recognizing that the
unique psychological effects of strip searches visited upon any human
being should be avoided in cases, like this one, where literally anyone
could be the next target. 307

300. Id.
301. See generally Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Prison Society in
Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Albert W. Florence, Florence, 621 F.3d 296 (No. 09-3603; No.
09-3661), 2010 WL 341403.
302. Id. at 9.
303. Id. at 9–10 (citing Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990);
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
304. Id. at 11 (citing McKeown, supra note 162, at 42); see also supra note 169 and
accompanying text.
305. Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting David C. James, Note,
Constitutional Limitations on Body Searches in Prisons, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1049–50
(1982)).
306. Id. at 20.
307. Id. at 20–21.
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III. REMOVING BLANKET POLICIES AND SEARCHING FOR
REASONABLENESS
Part II described the circuit split regarding the constitutionality of blanket
strip search policies as applied to pretrial detainees. Because social science
research shows that strip searches can cause serious psychological effects,
courts must hold that blanket strip search policies are unconstitutional.
Strip searches should only be conducted when a law enforcement officer
reasonably suspects that a detainee has contraband. Part III.A argues that
more research on American detainees is necessary, since the bulk of social
science research on strip searches is conducted overseas. It also advocates
for courts to use interdisciplinary views to inform their legal analyses.
Next, Part III.B uses current social science research to apply the Supreme
Court’s four-pronged balancing test from Bell v. Wolfish, and concludes
that the justification for a search must be very strong to outweigh the
extreme intrusion of a strip search. Finally, Part III.C proposes several
nonlegal remedies to ensure that strip searches are conducted in a nondiscriminatory manner and that detainees, especially trauma victims and
females, are treated with care during and after a strip search.
A. A Call for Greater Reliance on the Social Sciences
There are several barriers to conducting research on strip searches of
arrestees and detainees who, unlike prisoners, may be released shortly after
being booked and strip searched.308 Detainees may not want to discuss
their feelings because they feel humiliated and traumatized, or because they
want to avoid reliving the strip search.309 Moreover, the public generally is
not concerned with police precincts and correctional facilities unless there is
Correctional
evidence of severe violations of individual rights.310
institutions are likely to withhold information from the public, and it is
almost impossible to observe corrections officers’ daily activities and
interactions with detainees. 311
Despite these difficulties, more research into the prevalence and effects
of strip searches is needed to ensure that current findings are reliable.
Specifically, findings must be consistent over time and applicable to
broader populations of detainees, rather than only those involved in a given
study. Currently, strip search studies are primarily conducted in Canada,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom. 312 While the criminal justice systems
and policies of these countries are similar to those of the United States, only
further research can determine whether overseas studies can be generalized
to American policies and detainees. Similarly, a study on the effects of
strip searches in one American correctional facility may not yield the same
308. See, e.g., supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text (describing three detainees who
were released twelve hours or less after being strip searched).
309. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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results in a different facility in another part of the country. Only continued
research in different facilities and geographic locations can reveal whether
the findings on discrimination, trauma, humiliation, and desensitization in
strip search research are consistent across populations.313
However, research is not helpful if the courts turn a blind eye to it.
Courts rightly defer to legislatures and administrative agencies to ensure
that policies are reasonable and useful,314 but they must draw a line
between deference and willful ignorance of relevant research. While judges
should be skeptical about the validity and reliability of interdisciplinary
research, there is no reason to dismiss social science or other disciplines
outright as “faddish” or “hav[ing] no principled limit.” 315 Interdisciplinary
views can inform legal analysis, and courts that take into account a variety
of reliable sources can make more reasoned decisions than courts that
blindly defer to government agencies and legislatures no matter how
egregious and harmful a policy may be. Indeed, the fact that law
enforcement officials may be desensitized to the harmfulness of strip
searches suggests that courts need to weigh objective social science data
when deciding an issue as intimate as strip searches. 316
B. A Call for Reasonableness: Applying Bell’s Balancing Test in Light of
Current Social Science Research
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the government can curtail
individual rights to maintain security in correctional institutions.317 In Bell
v. Wolfish, the Court employed a four-factor balancing test, considering the
scope of the intrusion, the justification for initiating the intrusion, and the
manner and place in which it is conducted, to uphold a blanket strip search
policy applied to pretrial detainees.318 The circuit courts have all applied
the Bell test to cases when plaintiffs allege that strip searches violated their
constitutional rights. 319 However, the courts apply the test inconsistently,
resulting in a circuit split on the constitutionality of blanket policies
requiring strip searches of pretrial detainees.320 This section will apply
social science research to Bell’s four-factor balancing test, thereby
providing a more uniform and objective application of Bell to strip searches
of pretrial detainees.

313. See supra Part I.C.
314. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
315. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. V. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes
151–52 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
317. See supra Part I.A.2–3.
318. See supra Part I.A.3.
319. See supra Part II.A.1, II.B.
320. See supra notes 87–97 and accompanying text. Compare Part II.A, with Part II.B.
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1. Scope of the Intrusion
Because Bell did not articulate the magnitude of intrusion posed by a
strip search, there is little guidance for courts applying Bell’s balancing
test. 321 Circuit courts holding that blanket strip search policies are
unconstitutional emphasize the extreme scope of intrusion posed by strip
searches. 322 In contrast, the Third Circuit found that a visual strip search,
genital lift, and squat and cough were less intrusive than the visual body
cavity searches in Bell. 323 The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits have not
explicitly broken down their analyses according to Bell’s four-factor test.
Instead, they have held that the facts before them were indistinguishable
from the facts in Bell, and therefore follow Bell’s holding that blanket strip
search policies are constitutional.324
Clearly, additional research is critical in guiding the courts on this prong
of the Bell test. Judges alone cannot decide that one strip search procedure
is less intrusive than another based solely on their own perceptions of the
experience of undergoing a strip search. For example, the Third Circuit did
not state why lifting one’s genitals, squatting, and coughing is less intrusive
than undergoing a visual body cavity search. 325 Indeed, the social science
literature suggests that feelings of degradation and trauma would be similar
among those who are strip searched, regardless of the specific actions that a
detainee performs during a search.326 The process of having to strip naked,
being observed, and being told to comply with different commands, while
naked, appears to cause individuals to feel humiliated and ashamed.327
Moreover, strip searches make detainees feel helpless and relive traumatic
moments of sexual or physical violence. 328 Such evidence shows that strip
searches are extremely intrusive, and therefore can only be justified upon a
higher showing of the three other Bell prongs. 329
2. Place and Manner of the Strip Search
Courts must—and generally do—require that strip searches be conducted
professionally, by an officer of the same sex as the detainee, and in a private

321. Bell did not clearly apply the balancing test to the strip search policy at issue in the
case, but merely recognized the security dangers in the detention facility and the invasive
nature of strip searches. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 278–81 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part II.B.1–2.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 279, 281.
326. See supra Part I.C.
327. See supra Part I.C.
328. See supra Part I.C.
329. Courts must be wary of being swayed by current events and trends, thereby going
beyond the constitutional limits of reasonableness. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385,
392 n.4 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that this would go against the purpose of the
reasonableness requirement, which was adopted to protect peoples’ privacy and property
“even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of
intrusion ‘reasonable’” (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993))).
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area. 330 Given the serious nature of a strip search, a search conducted in
any other manner or place should be presumed unreasonable. 331
3. Justification for the Strip Search
The last prong of the Bell four-factor balancing test is the justification for
the strip search. Governments usually justify their interest in strip
searching with the security of correctional institutions and preventing the
smuggling of weapons, drugs, or other contraband. 332 The circuit courts
recognize that institutional security is a legitimate government interest.
However, courts holding that blanket strip search policies are
unconstitutional have found this interest outweighed by the lack of
justification for strip searches in all cases, such as for handcuffed detainees,
misdemeanants who cannot post bail, and people arrested for traffic or other
minor offenses. 333 On the other hand, the Eleventh, Ninth, and Third
Circuits held that ensuring correctional facilities are secure and free of
contraband justifies blanket strip searches.334
The justification for a strip search must be strong in order to outweigh the
high scope of intrusion involved. 335 Thus, a law enforcement officer
should only strip search a detainee suspected of concealing contraband,
such as after a drug- or weapon-related arrest, or when a detainee’s criminal
record includes recent drug or weapons possession. Strip searches cannot
be allowed on individuals arrested for traffic offenses or for non-violent
misdemeanors that do not involve drugs. Such a policy would ensure that
arrestees like Mary Bull, Leigh Fleming, and Charli Johnson are not
subjected to traumatizing strip searches after being arrested for minor
charges like disturbing the peace, and when they lack criminal records
suggesting they are likely to smuggle contraband. 336
Moreover, corrections officers should not resort to strip searches if other
resources exist to prevent detainees from smuggling contraband into a jail
or prison. For example, an arrestee in a single cell at a police station or
county jail who is isolated from other detainees will not be able to smuggle
drugs into the general prison population. Such an arrestee need only be
frisked, even if a small bag of drugs in a body cavity will go undetected.
This is true even for individuals arrested for a drug offense unless police
officers reasonably believe that they hid drugs in their body cavities. As the
First Circuit recognized in Roberts v. Rhode Island, 337 it is unlikely that
detainees will smuggle contraband when they are handcuffed and likely did

330. See supra note 219 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 270, 282 and
accompanying text.
331. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 259–63, 266–72, 284–85, 288 and accompanying text.
335. See supra Part I.C.
336. See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text.
337. 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001).
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not plan their arrests. 338 Even if they did plan their arrests, they simply
cannot smuggle contraband when completely isolated from other detainees.
C. Thinking Outside the Box: Nonlegal Suggestions
Research shows that giving police officers discretion to conduct strip
searches may increase the chance of racial, gender, ethnic, or other forms of
discrimination. 339 However, preventing discrimination alone should not be
enough to justify blanket strip searches that can psychologically damage
thousands of detainees. Corrections officers must be able to explain their
reasons for subjecting individual detainees to strip searches. Furthermore,
other means exist to monitor police discrimination and abuse of strip search
policies, such as installing closed circuit television in police stations. 340 A
less expensive alternative would be to monitor the records of police
precincts and correctional facilities to ensure that strip searches are
conducted only when there is reasonable suspicion that a detainee is
smuggling contraband. Though this may require more paperwork and
decrease the efficiency of the corrections system, increased transparency
may encourage officers to exercise more caution before conducting a strip
search. It may also encourage detainees to speak out if they feel
discriminated against or otherwise abused during the strip search, so that
others will scrutinize the accused police officers’ actions.341 Of course,
these are not determinations for a court, but for a legislature or an
administrative agency. Again, this is a field that would benefit from
research looking into effective ways to monitor discrimination and abuse in
the corrections system. 342
A final consideration for legislatures and agencies overseeing
correctional facilities is to ensure that police and corrections officers are
adequately trained in conducting strip searches. Institutions within a county
or city under the same strip search policy should make sure that strip
searches are carried out consistently across detainees. 343 Policies should
also specify procedures for common occurrences like menstruation or
lactation among female detainees, or for strip searches of transgendered
individuals, particularly in cities with a significant transgendered
population. 344 Additionally, officers should be aware of the psychological

338. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. Similarly, expert testimony in Bell
stated that there is not enough time and opportunity to hide contraband in a body cavity
during a visit at a detention facility. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. This is likely
also true of individuals who are arrested and who did not plan their arrests.
339. See supra notes 174–81 and accompanying text.
340. This was done in Newburn’s research study that discovered that police officers who
had discretion to strip search detainees exercised this discretion in discriminatory ways. See
supra notes 174–81 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 159–67 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 308–13 and
accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 228–32 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
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damage sustained by those who are strip searched.345 Detainees, especially
females, who violently resist, cry, or show other signs of trauma should be
handled cautiously and, if possible, debriefed after the strip search
procedure to ensure their mental well-being. 346 This is particularly true if
the female detainee is known to have suffered sexual violence in the past.347
Moreover, officers should be cognizant that even repeat offenders do not
simply “[get] used to” strip searches, and may actually find searches
increasingly shameful and difficult to bear.348
Despite corrections officers’ important roles in safeguarding institutions
while processing arrestees day after day, they must be reminded in periodic
training sessions that the detainees they watch over are human beings
entitled to basic levels of respect. Supervisors and legislators who create
policies receive wide-ranging deference from the courts, but their
judgments may be clouded by the nature of working in institutional
environments. 349 They should take an interdisciplinary approach when
creating and implementing policies for precincts and jails, consult with
specialists like psychologists and social scientists on the effects of strip
searches, and use less invasive alternatives to finding contraband. 350
CONCLUSION
Because of the widening circuit split on the constitutionality of blanket
strip search policies applied to pretrial detainees, more and more
government officials across the country are stripping detainees as a matter
of routine procedure without any reasonable suspicion. Courts that uphold
these blanket policies emphasize the security dangers in correctional
institutions 351 while turning a blind eye to the extremely intrusive and
humiliating nature of strip searches.352 Even judges that are skeptical about
the reliability of social science research cannot dismiss the unanimous
findings to date that strip searches are like sexual assaults that can cause
trauma and psychological harm to detainees.353 Courts must recognize that
an interdisciplinary approach and the use of social science research are
necessary given the very personal issue at hand.
Incorporating
interdisciplinary research leads to one logical conclusion: blanket strip
search policies must be held unconstitutional. Strip searches are so invasive
that individualized reasonable suspicion must be required each time an
345. See supra Part I.C.
346. See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
348. DOBASH ET AL., supra note 168, at 204; see also supra note 170 and accompanying
text.
349. See supra notes 195–203 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
351. See supra Part II.B.
352. See, e.g., supra notes 301–07 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit in Florence
made no mention of the social science arguments in the amicus brief submitted to the court.
See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010); supra
Part II.C.
353. See supra notes 168–73, 182–94 and accompanying text.
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officer subjects a detainee to a strip search. Holding otherwise would
simply undermine the Fourth Amendment’s protections against
unreasonable searches.

